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ALLOCATION OF BACK-PAY LIABILITY
BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND UNION:
Bo WEN V UNITED STA TES
POSTAL SER VICE
ON February 21, 1976, the United States Postal Service suspended
Charles V. Bowen without pay following an altercation with an-
other employee.' After the Service formally terminated Bowen on
March 30, 1976, he filed a grievance with the American Postal Workers
Union.2 When the union refused to take Bowen's grievance to arbitration,
Bowen filed suit against the Service and the union in federal district court.
Bowen charged the Service with violating the collective bargaining agree-
ment between the Service and the union 3 by discharging him without just
1. After being harassed by another employee, Bowen received permission to go home.
While leaving, Bowen encountered the employee in a stairway. The two exchanged words
and scuffled briefly. The Lynchburg postmaster suspended Bowen pending the completion
of an investigation of the incident. On March 15, 1976, the postmaster notified Bowen that
he would be dismissed. Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, reprinted in 16 LAW REPRINTS, LAB. L.
SERIES (BNA), No. 3, at 77, 90-91 (1982-1983 Term).
2. The American Postal Workers Union is the recognized collective bargaining agent
for United States Postal Service employees under its collective bargaining agreement with
the Service. The recognized collective bargaining agent is elected by a majority of the em-
ployees, and the employer has a duty to bargain in good faith exclusively with the recog-
nized bargaining agent. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 374 (1976). The collective bargaining agreement is a written con-
tract between the employer and the union. The labor contract establishes the relationship
between the employer and its employees and among the employees themselves by setting job
categories and seniority classifications. A labor contract normally contains provisions gov-
erning wages, hours, discipline, transfers and promotions, insurance, vacations and holidays,
work assignments, and seniority. The agreement is not an employment contract, but rather
an agreement governing the tenure and terms of employment of separately hired individu-
als. Id. at 540. See generally Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663 (1973) (responsibilities and relationships created by collective
bargaining agreements).
3. Bowen filed suit against the Postal Service under § 1208(b) of the Postal Reorgani-
zation Act which provides that "[s]uits for violation of contracts between the Postal Service
and a labor organization representing Postal Service employees, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy." 39 U.S.C. § 1208(b) (1976).
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1976) states that "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation representing employees. . . may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties .... " Courts have recognized the general applicability of
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cause.4 Bowen also claimed that the union breached its duty of fair repre-
sentation5 by handling his grievance inan arbitrary and perfunctory man-
ner.6 The federal district court held that the Service wrongfully discharged
Bowen and that the union breached its duty of fair representation. 7 The
court found that Bowen lost $52,954 in wages and benefits and ordered the
union to pay $30,000 and the Service to pay the remainder. 8 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
apportionment of fault' but overturned the damage award against the
union.9 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, re-
law developed under § 301 to Postal Service suits arising under § 1208(b) of the Postal Reor-
ganization Act. See, e.g., National Post Office Mail Handlers Local No. 305 v. United States
Postal Serv., 594 F.2d 988, 991 (4th Cir. 1979); National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. United
States Postal Serv., 590 F.2d 1171, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Pittsburg Metro Area Postal Work-
ers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 463 F. Supp. 54, 57 n.3 (W.D. Pa. 1978), af'd, 609
F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1979). But see Smith v. Daws, 614 F.2d 1069, 1071-72 (5th Cir.) (court
refused to follow decisions that based jurisdiction on § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act even
though court agreed that § 1208(b) of the Postal Reorganization Act is substantially identi-
cal to § 301), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980).
4. Just cause is defined as "[ilegitimate cause; legal or lawful ground for action; such
reasons as will suffice in law to justify the action taken." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 775
(5th ed. 1979).
5. Before Bowen could recover from the Postal Service for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement, he had to prove that his union breached its duty of fair
representation.
6. A national union official, working under a brief time extension, rejected Bowen's
arbitration request after spending less than 30 minutes reviewing Bowen's file. Due to a
heavy backlog of arbitration requests, this union official rejected arbitration on all cases that
he reviewed on the day he refused Bowen's request. Brief for Petitioner at 6, reprinted in
LAW REPRINTS, LABOR L. SERIES (BNA), No. 3, at 92 (1982-1983 Term).
7. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 470 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (W.D. Va. 1979).
8. Id. at 1131. The court instructed the jury to determine the amount of compensatory
damages to be awarded and to apportion liability for the damages between the Postal Serv-
ice and the union. The court left the method of apportionment to the jury's discretion, but
indicated that the jury could base the apportionment on a hypothetical date at which time
the employee would have been reinstated but for the union's breach of its duty of fair repre-
sentation. The jury returned a hypothetical date of August 1977 and apportioned damages
accruing after that date to the union. Id. at 1129. The approach used by the district court is
summarized by the following diagram:
Employer Liability Union Liability
Grievance Hypothetical Point ofSettlement Absent Decision onProducing Event Union Breach of the Merits
i.e. Discharge DFR
I I I
March 30, 1976 August 1977 April I1, 1979
Comment, Apportionment of Damages in DFR/Contract Suits.- Who Pays for the Union's
Breach, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 155, 171.
9. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1981). The court stated
that since "Bowen's compensation was at all times payable only by the Service, reimburse-
ment of his lost earnings continued to be the obligation of the Service exclusively. Hence, no




versed and remanded: When an employer breaches a collective bargaining
agreement by wrongfully discharging an employee and the employee's
union breaches its duty of fair representation in handling the employee's
grievance with the employer, the union is liable for back-pay damages ac-
cruing after a hypothetical date on which the employee would have been
reinstated but for the union's breach. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv-
ice, 103 S. Ct. 588, 74 L. Ed. 2d 402 (1983).
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION/BREACH OF CONTRACT SUIT
A. The Union's Duty of Fair Representation
The United States Supreme Court first established the duty of fair repre-
sentation in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville RailroadI0 Steele, a Railway
Labor Act" l case, involved a racially discriminatory collective bargaining
agreement that restricted black employees' entrance into certain jobs. 2
The Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed a complaint filed by a group of
black employees, holding that a union had absolute authority to negotiate
and modify the rights of company employees. 13 The United States
Supreme Court reversed the Alabama court and held that the Railway La-
bor Act implicitly imposed a duty on the union to protect the interests of
all affected employees.14
Nine years later the Supreme Court recognized a duty of fair representa-
10. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). For more detailed discussion of the history of the duty of fair
representation, see Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151 (1957); Com-
ment, The Duty of Fair Representation, 20 CATH. U.L. REV. 271 (1970).
11. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Lower courts have recognized the
right of an employee to file an action under the Railway Labor Act similar to one brought
under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 719-20
(1945), aft'don reh'g, 327 U.S. 661 (1946); Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630, 632-33
(1941); Comment, supra note 8, at 158 n.16; see also Feller, supra note 2, at 676-86 (discuss-
ing employee suits for breach of collective bargaining agreement under Railway Labor Act).
12. A group of black firemen sued the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company and
the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen to enjoin enforcement of an agree-
ment that provided that not more than 50% of the firemen in each job category could be
negroes. The agreement further provided that all new vacancies be filled by white men until
the 50% limit was reached. The agreement did not permit the employment of negroes in any
job category in which they were not already working.
13. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 245 Ala. 113, 16 So. 2d 416, 419-20 (1944). The court
stated that "'[t]he [Union] had the power by agreement with the Railway to create the sen-
iority rights of plaintiff, and it likewise by the same method had the power to modify or
destroy these rights in the interests of all the members.'" 16 So. 2d at 419 (quoting Hartley
v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885, 887 (1938)).
14. 323 U.S. at 202. During the same term the Supreme Court indicated in a dictum
that unions governed by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981), had the responsibility of fairly representing the interests of all employees.
Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944). In Wallace a newly elected union refused
membership to a group of employees because they had previously belonged to a competing
union. Wallace discharged the employees because the collective bargaining agreement re-
quired that all employees be union members. The discharged employees then brought suit
against the union seeking reinstatement of their employment with Wallace. The Court held
that the employee's selection of a union as their collective bargaining agent imposed a re-
sponsibility on the union to represent the employees' interests fairly and impartially. Id.
1983]
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tion in a collective bargaining agreement governed by the National Labor
Relations Act.' 5 In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman 16 the Court discussed the
issue of whether a union could create reasonable distinctions between em-
ployment groups. The Supreme Court upheld a collective bargaining
agreement that granted seniority for military service to World War II vet-
erans not employed by Ford Motor Company before the war. 17 Justice
Burton, writing for a unanimous Court, reasoned that distinctions between
employees are not necessarily invalid.' 8 He stated, however, that the
union, as the recognized collective bargaining agent, was responsible for
the representation of the interests of all affected employees.' 9
The Court further delineated a union's duty of fair representation in
Vaca v. Sipes.20 In Vaca an employee filed a grievance with his union
after being discharged from his job at a meat packing plant.21 The union
refused to arbitrate the employee's grievance, although the collective bar-
gaining agreement provided for arbitration.22 The Court concluded that
the union's failure to take the grievance to arbitration constituted a breach
of its duty of fair representation only if the union's conduct was arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith. 23
B. The Individual Employee's Suit Against the Employer for Breach of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills24 the Supreme Court consid-
ered the rights of parties to a collective bargaining agreement to bring suit
in federal court for breach of the agreement under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act.25 In Lincoln Mills the Textile Workers Union
sued Lincoln Mills for breach of the collective bargaining agreement after
the company refused to arbitrate the union's grievances as provided for by
the agreement. The Court held that any party to a collective bargaining
agreement may sue for breach of the agreement in federal court.26
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
16. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
17. Id. at 331.
18. Id. at 338.
19. Id Justice Burton declared that "[tihe bargaining representative, whoever it may
be, is responsible to, and owes complete loyalty to, the interests of all whom it represents."
Id.; see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957) (duty of fair representation in admin-
istration of collective bargaining agreement, rather than its formation).
20. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
21. Swift & Company dismissed the employee on the ground of poor health after
Swift's company doctor determined that the employee's blood pressure was too high.
22. The collective bargaining agreement between Swift and the National Brotherhood
of Packinghouse Workers provided for a five-step grievance procedure. The union refused
to take the employee's grievance to arbitration, the fourth step of the grievance procedure,
after receiving a medical report that failed to substantiate the employee's claim against
Swift.
23. 386 U.S. at 193. The Court held that the union did not breach its duty of fair
representation, because the union based its decision on sound medical evidence. Id at 193-
94.
24. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976); see supra note 3.
26. 353 U.S. at 456. The Court based its holding on the legislative history of § 301.
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Five years later, in Smith v. Evening News Association ,27 the Supreme
Court recognized the right of an individual employee, rather than the
union, to bring a section 301 action against his employer for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement. 28 Smith and several other employees
sued Evening News in federal district court for breach of a collective bar-
gaining agreement, which did not include arbitration or grievance proce-
dures, after the company prevented the employees from reporting to their
regular shifts during a strike by a different union. The Court concluded
that an individual employee could sue his employer for breach of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. 29 The Supreme Court held in Republic Steel
Corp. v. Aaddox, 30 however, that an employee must attempt to exhaust
grievance and arbitration procedures provided by the collective bargaining
agreement before suing the employer for breach of the agreement under
section 301. 3 1 Maddox filed suit against his employer for severance pay
allegedly due him under the collective bargaining agreement. Maddox
made no attempt to exhaust a three-step grievance procedure provided by
the collective bargaining agreement. The Court concluded that an em-
ployee could not sue his employer for breach of the collective bargaining
agreement without first attempting to exhaust contractually provided rem-
edies, 32 but failed to discuss whether an employee could file suit if the
contractually provided remedies failed to operate properly.33
Quoting from the House debate, the Court stated that § 301 proceedings can be "'brought
by the employers, the labor organizations, or interested individual employees ... in order
to secure declarations from the Court of legal rights under the contract.' " Id. (quoting 93
CONG. REC. 3656 (1947) (statement of Representative Barden)). The Court also concluded
that federal substantive law applies to suits arising under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. 353
U.S. at 456. See generally Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements Under Taft-
Hartley Section 301, 66 YALE L.J. 167 (1956) (applicability of state and federal law to suits
under § 301).
27. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
28. Id. at 200-01.
29. Id at 200; see Recent Decisions, Suits by Individual Employeesfor Breach of Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreements May be Brought Under Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 24 MONT. L. REV. 161, 176 (1963); see also Summers, Individual Rights in
Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 362 (1962) (individual employee
rights prior to Smith).
30. 379 U.S. 650 (1965). For a discussion of Maddox, see Note, Labor Law-Section
301 and Requiring Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures, 25 LA. L. REV. 949 (1965). See also
Fox & Sonenthal, Section 301 and Exhaustion of Intra- Union Appeals: A Misbegotten Mar-
riage, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 989 (1980) (consequences of requiring exhaustion of intra-union
grievance procedures); Comment, The Exhaustion of Internal Union Remedies as a Prerequi-
site to Section 301 Actions Against Labor Unions and Employers, 55 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 259
(1979) (discussion of internal union remedies and § 301 actions).
31. 379 U.S. at 652-53. Justice Harlan observed that "it cannot be said, in the normal
situation, that contract grievance procedures are inadequate to protect the interests of an
aggrieved employee until the employee has attempted to implement the procedures and
found them so." Id. at 653.
32. Id The Court noted that certain exceptions to the exhaustion rule may prevail.
Severance claims, however, are within the general rule of exhaustion. Id at 654-56.
33. Martucci, Employer Liabilityfor Union Unfair Representation: The Judicial Predilec-
tion and Underlying Policy Considerations, 46 Mo. L. REV. 78, 87 (1981).
19831
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C The Duty of Fair Representation/Breach of Contract Suit
The Supreme Court first recognized the possibility of bringing a com-
bined action for breach of the duty of fair representation and breach of the
collective bargaining agreement in Humphrey v. Moore .34 In that case a
group of discharged employees challenged a joint union-employer modifi-
cation of their contractual seniority rights. The Court permitted the em-
ployees to bring a single action against the employer for breach of contract
and against the union for breach of its duty of fair representation, 35 but
held that neither the union nor the employer breached their respective
responsibilities. 36
The Court's next opportunity to consider a combined breach of duty of
fair representation/breach of contract suit arose three years later in Vaca v.
Sopes. 37 The Court found no evidence that the union had breached its
duty of fair representation, but did state that if a union breaches that duty,
the employer may not assert the defense of the employee's failure to ex-
haust contractual remedies prior to filing a suit for breach of the collective
agreement.38 In addition, the Court established a governing principle for
apportioning damages once a breach of the union's duty of fair representa-
tion has been established. 39 Specifically, damages are to be allocated be-
tween the union and the employer based on the respective fault of each
party.40
The Supreme Court first implemented Vaca's apportionment rule in
Czosek v. O'Mara 4' a Railway Labor Act 42 case in which a group of dis-
charged employees sued both the employer and the union after their union
declined to take the employees' grievances to arbitration. The defendant
34. 375 U.S. 335 (1964). For a discussion of Humphrey, see Recent Cases, Labor Law-
NLRA-Union's Duty to Represent Fairly, 17 VAND. L. REV. 1310, 1328 (1964).
35. 375 U.S. at 343-44. For a discussion of the procedural difficulties encountered in a
duty of fair representation/breach of contract suit, see Tobias, Individual Employee Suits for
Breach of the Labor Agreement and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 5 U. TOL. L.
REV. 514 (1974).
36. 375 U.S. at 351.
37. 386 U.S. 171 (1967); see supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (facts in Vaca).
38. 386 U.S. at 186.
39. Justice White, writing for a five-member majority, established the following stan-
dard for apportionment of liability between the union and the employer:
The governing principle, then, is to apportion liability between the em-
ployer and the union according to the damage caused by the fault of each.
Thus, damages attributable solely to the employer's breach of contract should
not be charged to the union, but increases if any in those damages caused by
the union's refusal to process the grievance should not be charged to the
employer.
Id. at 197-98. Before a court applies Vaca's rule in apportioning damages between the
union and the employer, the employee must prove that the union breached its duty of fair
representation and that the employer breached the collective bargaining agreement. Id at
187-88. For a discussion of the application of Vaca's governing principle, see Linsey, The
Apportionment of Liabilityfor Damages Between Employer and Union in § 301 Actions Involv-
ing a Union's Breach of its Duty of Fair Representation, 30 MERCER L. REV. 661 (1979);
Martucci, supra note 31; Comment, supra note 8.
40. 386 U.S. at 197-98.
41. 397 U.S. 25 (1970).
42. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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employer was dismissed from the suit because the plaintiffs failed to ex-
haust their administrative remedies and failed to allege that the employer
took part in the union's purported discrimination.43 The Court refused to
assess back-pay damages against the union because the wrongful discharge
by the employer was independent of any wrongful conduct by the union.44
In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight Inc. 45 the employer discharged a
group of employees for misrepresenting their motel expenses. An arbitra-
tor sustained the discharges based on evidence that was later shown to be
false. After discovering that the evidence was false, the employees sued
the employer and also charged their union with breach of the duty of fair
representation since the falsified evidence should have been discovered by
the union. The Supreme Court held that an employer may not assert de-
fensively the finality of a favorable arbitration ruling if the union has
breached its duty of fair representation. 46 The Court remanded the case to
determine whether the employer had breached the collective bargaining
agreement. 47 The opinion failed to discuss how the lower court should
apportion damages if the employer had breached the agreement. Justice
Stewart, however, in a concurring opinion interpreting Vaca clearly out-
lined a method for apportioning damages. 48 According to Justice Stewart,
the employer is not liable for back pay when the employer had relied in
good faith on a binding arbitration ruling.49
43. 397 U.S. at 26-27.
44. Id. at 28-29. The Court declared that "damages against the union for loss of em-
ployment are unrecoverable except to the extent that its refusal to handle the grievances
added to the difficulty and expense of collecting from the employer." Id. at 29.
45. 424 U.S. 554 (1976). For a discussion of both Vaca and Hines, see Comment, Duty
of Fair Representation-Consequences for Breach, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1042
(1976).
46. 424 U.S. at 567. Justice White, writing for the court, noted that
"it makes little difference whether the union subverts the arbitration process
by refusing to proceed as in Vaca or follow the arbitration trail to the end, but
in so doing subverts the arbitration process by failing to fairly represent the
employee. In neither case, does the employee receive fair representation."
Id. at 572 (quoting Margetta v. Pam Pam Corp., 501 F.2d 179, 180 (9th Cir. 1974)). One
commentator criticizes Hines as destroying the traditional adversary nature of grievance
arbitration. Coulson, Vaca v. Sipes' Illegitimate Child.- The Impact of Anchor Motor Freight
on the Finality Doctrine in Grievance Arbitration, 10 GA. L. REV. 693 (1976).
47. 424 U.S. at 572.
48. Id. at 573. Justice Stewart asserted:
If an employer relies in good faith on a favorable arbitral decision, then his
failure to reinstate discharged employees cannot be anything but rightful, until
there is a contrary determination. Liability for the intervening wage loss must
fall not on the employer but on the union. Such an apportionment of damages
is mandated by Vaca's holding that "damages attributable solely to the em-
ployer's breach of contract should not be charged to the union, but increases if
any in those damages caused by the union's refusal to process the grievance
should not be charged to the employer." ... To hold an employer liable for
back wages for the period during which he rightfully refuses to rehire dis-
charged employees would be to charge him with a contractual violation on the
basis of conduct precisely in accord with the dictates of the collective
agreement.
Id. Although Justice Stewart's concurrence provided a simple explanation of Vaca's gov-
erning principle, it was not followed by any other member of the Court.
49. Id.
1983]
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The Supreme Court again faced a combined duty of fair representa-
tion/breach of contract suit in International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers v. Foust.50 In Foust a discharged employee sued both his union
and his employer after the union failed to file a grievance within the sixty-
day period provided for by the collective bargaining agreement. The em-
ployee alleged that the union's failure to file the grievance within the speci-
fied period constituted a breach of the union's duty of fair representation.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's award of
compensatory and punitive damages against the union.5' The Supreme
Court held, however, that punitive damages could not be imposed on a
union for breach of its duty of fair representation.5 2 Although the lower
court had assessed back-pay damages against the union, the Court refused
to consider whether the apportionment of those damages was proper since
neither party appealed that portion of the lower court's decision.53
Although the Vaca decision attempted to establish a straightforward
rule of apportionment, lower courts have applied it inconsistently.5 4 The
Fourth Circuit in Bowen v. United States Postal Service55 was the first
court of appeals to consider Vaca's apportionment rule when reviewing a
district court finding that the union's breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion caused an increase in the damages incurred by an employee. The
Fourth Circuit's holding that only the employer may be held liable for
50. 442 U.S. 42 (1979). Foust's employer dismissed him for failure to request a medical
leave extension as required by the collective bargaining agreement.
51. Id. at 45. The Court, however, remanded the case for a determination of whether
the award of punitive damages was excessive. Id
52. Id. at 52. The Court based its decision on the ground that federal labor policy does
not favor punishment. In addition, this imposition of punitive damages would inflict a sub-
stantial burden on union funds and could undermine the flexibility and efficiency necessary
for fair grievance procedures. Id at 50-52. Although concurring in the result, Justice Black-
mun, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Stevens, disagreed with the
majority's holding that punitive damages are never appropriate when a union has breached
its duty of fair representation. Id at 52-53. Blackmun outlined four principles the majority
relied on in establishing a per se rule against imposing punitive damages against a union:
(1) an employee should only be compensated for his injury; (2) punitive damages are against
federal labor policy; (3) punitive damages could deplete union treasuries, impairing a
union's ability to bargain effectively; and (4) punitive damages would limit the broad discre-
tion that Vaca afforded unions, thus disrupting rational decisionmaking. Id. at 54-57.
53. Id. at 45 n.4.
54. See, e.g., Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 214-15 (5th Cir. 1982) (court refused
to impose back-pay damages on labor union since such damages constitute natural conse-
quences of employer's breach); Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 957, 580
F.2d 232, 236-37 (6th Cir. 1978) (court imposed all back-pay damages on employer since
record failed to support allocation of damages against union), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896
(1981); DeArroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 289-90 (Ist
Cir.) (employer forced to pay all back-pay damages since evidence failed to show that but
for union's breach employee would have been reinstated or reimbursed at earlier date), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); St. Clair v. Local 515, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 422 F.2d 128, 132
(6th Cir. 1969) (employer held liable for back-pay damages because damages caused by
union's breach are virtually de minimus when union's actions are not cause of employees'
discharge). But see Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 312 (6th Cir. 1975)
(court held labor union and employer jointly liable for back-pay damages based on assump-
tion that gravity of both parties' actions as well as chronology of events were appropriate
factors in determining how damages were to be apportioned between defendants).
55. 642 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 588, 74 L. Ed. 2d 402 (1983).
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back-pay damages 56 conflicted with the Supreme Court's holding in Vaca
that damages should be apportioned between union and employer on the
basis of relative fault.
II. Bo WEN v UNITED STA TES POSTAL SERVICE
In Bowen v. United States Postal Service the Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether a labor union that breached its duty of fair repre-
sentation could be held liable for back pay accruing after a hypothetical
arbitration date. 57 Relying on Vaca, the Court held the union liable for
back pay accruing after a hypothetical date on which Bowen would have
been reinstated but for the union's breach.58 The employer who breached
the collective bargaining agreement by wrongfully discharging the plaintiff
was held liable for back pay accruing prior to that date.5 9 Justice Powell,
writing for the majority,60 reiterated the Vaca principle that the damages
must be apportioned in accordance with the respective fault of each of the
parties. 6'
The majority found the policy interests underlying federal labor law
persuasive. 62 The foremost of these policy interests is the right of the in-
jured employee to be made whole.63 The Court reaffirmed Vaca's holding
that the union's breach of its duty of fair representation should not shield
the employer from the consequences of its breach.64 The union's breach of
duty, however, which negates the employer's defense of failure to exhaust
contractual remedies, also requires that the union bear the responsibility of
the increased damages caused by its breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion.65 The Court also considered the unfairness of imposing back-pay
damages arising from the union's breach of duty on the employer. 66 The
Court emphasized the inappropriateness of holding the employer liable for
the consequences of the union's actions, stating that to impose all back-pay
56. 642 F.2d at 82.
57. 103 S. Ct. 588, 590, 74 L. Ed. 2d 402, 407 (1983); see supra note 8.
58. 103 S. Ct. at 599, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 417-18.
59. Id. The Court limited its holding to situations where neither the union nor the
employer participate in the other's breach. Id. at 595 n.l 1, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 413 n. 11. The
Court also reversed the decrease in damages by the court of appeals and reinstated the dis-
trict court's findings. Id at 599, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 417-18. All the dissenting Justices concurred
with the reinstatement of damages except for Justice Rehnquist, who filed a separate opinion
concerning the damages issue. Id at 607-08, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 428-29.
60. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Stevens,
and O'Connor.
61. Id. at 593, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 410 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197-98 (1967)).
62. 103 S. Ct. at 594-95, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 412-13. The Court cited Vaca as establishing
the interests that "provide a measure of its principle for apportioning damages." Id at 595,
74 L. Ed. 2d at 412.
63. Id
64. Id
65. Id., 74 L. Ed. 2d at 413. The Court stated that "[elven though both the employer
and the union have caused the damage suffered by the employee, the union is responsible
for the increase in damages and, as between the two wrongdoers, should bear its portion of




damages on the employer would overlook the interests of the parties to the
collective bargaining agreement.67 On the other hand, the Court found it
fair to impose on the union the burden of financial responsibility for its
wrongful actions.68 The Court noted that the union assumed responsibility
for its actions by seeking and acquiring the exclusive right to represent a
group of employees. In addition, an employer, as a party to a collective
bargaining agreement, should be able to rely on a union's decision not to
process a discharged employee's grievance to the same extent that the em-
ployer could rely on an employee who failed to exercise his independent
right to act on his own behalf.69 The Court concluded that the inability of
an employer to rely on a union's decision would be detrimental to the
orderly settlement of grievances between the parties. 70 In the absence of
an allocation of back pay to the union, an employer would also be less
likely to enter into a collective bargaining agreement that included a cus-
tomarily written arbitration clause.7 1
The Court next discussed the relationship created between an employer
and a labor union by a collective bargaining agreement.72 The Court con-
firmed the status of the grievance procedure as a fundamental element of
federal labor policy.73 The existence of grievance procedures in standard
collective bargaining provides the parties with a peaceful method of nego-
tiation, thus strengthening the collective bargaining agreement.74 Requir-
ing the union to pay its share of the damages would not impose a burden
inconsistent with federal labor policy but rather would provide the union
with an additional incentive to process the claims of its members dili-
gently. 75 The Court viewed holding the union accountable for increases in
damages as a proper means of enforcing a duty owed to union members
and enforcing a contractual obligation owed by the union to the
67. Id at 596, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 414.
68. Id. at 597, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 415.
69. Id at 596-97, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 415.
70. Id. at 597, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 415-16.
71. Id., 74 L. Ed. 2d at 416.
72. Id at 596, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 414. The Court compared the relationships created in a
collective bargaining agreement to those created in an ordinary contract, stating that "a
collective-bargaining agreement 'is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a
myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate.'" Id (quoting United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960)).
73. 103 S. Ct. at 596, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 414 (citing John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376
U.S. 543, 549 (1964); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960)). The Court stated that the grievance procedure "promotes the goal of industrial
peace by providing a means for labor and management to settle disputes through negotia-
tion rather than industrial strife." 103 S. Ct. at 596, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 414.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 597-98, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 416. The Court noted that holding the union liable for
its share of the employee's damages is consistent with International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1978), which held that punitive damages could not be imposed on a
union for breach of its duty of fair representation. Id at 48-52. The Bowen Court reasoned
that "[an award of compensatory damages ... normally will be limited and finite. More-
over, the union's exercise of discretion is shielded by the standard necessary to prove a
breach of the duty of fair representation. Thus, the threat that was present in Foust is absent




Finally, the Court distinguished Bowen from its holding in Czosek v.
O'Mara .77 In Czosek the Court held that only the employee's added ex-
pense of collecting damages from the employer could be assessed against
the union as a result of the union's breach. 78 In Bowen, however, the
Court explained that the applicable law in Czosek, the Railway Labor Act,
provided the discharged employee with an alternative remedy in the event
of a union's decision not to process the employee's grievance. 79 Since the
injured employee had immediate access to an alternate remedy, the
union's breach of its duty of fair representation did not increase the dam-
ages incurred by the discharged employee except for the added expense of
recovering damages from the employer.8 0 The Court reasoned that Czo-
sek's holding is consistent with Vaca because the added expense of collect-
ing from the employer is the only damage attributable to the union's
wrongful actions.8 '
Justice White, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Rehnquist, disagreed with the majority's interpretation of
Vaca. Justice White first discussed the history of the duty of fair represen-
tation suit and the breach of contract suit,8 2 and cited Vaca as holding that
the only consequence of the union's breach is the lifting of the bar to the
individual employee's suit against the employer for breach of contract
before the employee has exhausted contractual grievance procedures. 83
Furthermore, Justice White interpreted Vaca, Czosek, and Hines as estab-
lishing that the union's independent breach would not shield the employer
from the natural consequences of its breach of the collective bargaining
agreement.8 4 Justice White argued that the majority's reliance on the al-
ternative remedy provided by the Railway Labor Act was misplaced be-
cause the availability of an alternative remedy has never been considered
relevant in determining the proper apportionment of damages under
Vaca .85
76. Id. at 597-98, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 416.
77. 397 U.S. 25 (1970).
78. Id. at 29.
79. 103 S. Ct. at 599, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 417. Section 153 First (i) of The Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (1976) permits an employee whose union fails to process his
grievance to process it himself. Section 153 First (i) provides:
The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or
carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of
agreements. . . shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the
chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but,
failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred by
petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the
Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data
bearing upon the disputes.
80. 103 S. Ct. at 598-99, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 417.
81. Id. at 599, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 417.
82. Id at 600-02, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 419-21.
83. Id. at 600, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 419.
84. Id. at 600-02, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 419-21.
85. Id at 602 n.5, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 421 n.5.
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Justice White next argued that the majority opinion went beyond the
Court's holding in Vaca. Even though the union cannot reinstate the em-
ployee, the majority insulated the employer from further liability after the
hypothetical arbitration date. 86 The union will therefore usually bear the
larger portion of the damages since the hypothetical arbitration date nor-
mally occurs within one year of the discharge. 87 Justice White maintained
that the majority's holding would detrimentally affect the grievance ma-
chinery since unions would bring unmeritorious grievances to arbitration
to protect themselves from liability for back-pay damages.88 Finally, Jus-
tice White outlined two situations in which a union should be held liable
for back-pay damages. First, the union and the employer should be jointly
liable for back-pay damages when the union has induced the employer to
breach the collective bargaining agreement. Second, the union should be
secondarily liable to the plaintiff when the union has not induced the em-
ployer's breach but the union's breach of its duty of fair representation has
prevented the injured employee from collecting from the employer. 89
Justice Rehnquist authored a separate dissent disagreeing with the ma-
jority's reinstatement of the damages found by the district court.90 Justice
Rehnquist based his decision on Bowen's failure to cross-appeal the dis-
trict court's award of damages against the Postal Service. He stated that
Bowen should have filed a conditional cross-appeal seeking to increase
damages against the Service if the court of appeals held the union not
liable. By failing to cross-appeal, according to Rehnquist, Bowen lost his
right to increase his award against the Service. 9'
III. CONCLUSION
In Bowen v. United States Postal Service the United States Supreme
Court held that a labor union that fails to represent a union member fairly
in a grievance proceeding against his employer for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement is liable for the employee's damages accruing after a
hypothetical arbitration date. The Court based its decision on Vaca v.
Sies, the relationships and interests created by the collective bargaining
agreement, and the national labor policy favoring peaceful arbitration of
grievances. The opinion provides the first comprehensive explanation of
86. Id at 602-03, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 422.
87. Id. at 603, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 422-23. The average time lag between the filing of a
grievance and an arbitration decision ranged from a high of 268.3 days in 1977 to a low of
223.5 days in 1975 and 1978. Id. at 601 n.4, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 421 n.4 (citing FEDERAL MEDIA-
TION & CONCILIATION SERV., THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 39 (1981)).
88. 103 S. Ct. at 605, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 425. The validity of Justice White's prediction
depends upon the ability of lower courts to interpret consistently the standard delineated in
Vaca for breach of the duty of fair representation. See supra note 23 and accompanying
text. If the lower courts interpret the standard consistently, the union is required only to
remain within that standard. If, however, the courts fail to do so, many unions may choose
to take all grievances to arbitration in order to avoid the possibility of incurring liability for
back pay.
89. 103 S. Ct. at 605-06, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 425-26.
90. Id at 607-08, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 428; see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
91. 103 S. Ct. at 608, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 428.
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the Vaca decision regarding allocation of damages in labor disputes. The
Bowen decision establishes a "but for" test of causation to be used in de-
termining the appropriate apportionment of back-pay damages, and
should prompt labor unions to consider carefully a union member's griev-
ance before refusing to take it to arbitration, since the consequences of an
incorrect decision will now fall upon the union rather than the employer.
The Court's allocation of liability in Bowen provides incentives to insure
that both parties to a collective bargaining agreement will perform their
respective duties.
C. John Scheef III

